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INTRODUCTION
From the outset of this case, the Plaintiffs/Appellees (collectively the "Ivie
Group") sought damages for Defendant/Appellant Aspen Ridge's failure to purchase Lot
27 in accordance with the agreement between the parties. Nevertheless, the Ivie Group
made the strategic decision not to present appraisal testimony to attempt to establish its
damages in accordance with the long and well-established rule that the measure of
damages for the breach of a contract to purchase land is the difference between fair
market value and contract price on the date of breach. This was not an oversight and the
Ivie Group never claimed it was. Because of the wealth of comparable sales in Wolf
Creek Ranch and Aspen Ridge's appraisal testimony based thereon that the fair market
value was $1,220,000, the Ivie Group presumably knew an appraisal would not be helpful
to their case.
The Ivie Group attempted instead to recover damages unrelated to fair market
value. Finally, long after they would have been required by the Scheduling Order to serve
any appraisal upon Aspen Ridge, and facing the fact that they could not prevail with their
flawed damage theory, the Ivie Group attempted to amend the Complaint to allege
specific performance as an alternative remedy. The Ivie Group did so even though they
had long before lost any right to seek specific performance by, among other things, their
inconsistent action in listing Lot 27 for sale. Only after the district court correctly denied
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that motion and denied the Ivie Group's reconsideration motion at the outset of trial did
the Ivie Group scramble to try to come up with evidence of fair market value to support a
claim of damages.
The solution the Ivie Group hit upon was to have Richard Buys - - who had
already emphatically testified in his deposition that he was not in real estate and did not
know the fair market value or even the assessed value - - testify in contradiction to his
deposition without any prior notice or warning on the second day of a three day trial that
he did after all have an opinion of fair market value and that Lot 27 was worth a mere
$500,000. This amount was hundreds of thousands of dollars less than the improvement
costs alone and far less than half the amount each of the two adjacent lots, as well as a
number of other wolf Creek Ranch lots, sold for close in time to the valuation date. The
district court allowed this surprise testimony even though the Ivie Group unequivocally
stated in answers to interrogatories that they had no opinion on fair market value and fair
market value was irrelevant to their damage claim.
There was no foundation for Buys's testimony, which was the only "evidence"
presented by the Ivie Group that could possibly support a $500,000 valuation. The
district court erred as a matter of law in permitting Buys to testify just because he had a
15% ownership interest in Lot 27. Moreover, the trial court erred in permitting the Ivie
Group to present this surprise testimony contradicting Buys's deposition testimony and
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their interrogatory answer that were never amended or supplemented. Buys's testimony
was litigation by ambush.

ARGUMENT

A. THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
JURY'S AWARD OF DAMAGES,
The Ivie Group argues in their brief [pp. 18-29] that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in permitting Buys to testify on value, but that even if that was error, there was
other evidence sufficient to establish that Lot 27 had a fair market value of $500,000.
These arguments are without merit, and should be rejected.

1. There Was No Foundation For Buys to Testify Concerning the Fair
Market Value of Lot 27.
Buys was a 15% owner of Lot 27. The Ivie Group did not introduce any evidence
showing that Buys had any appreciable knowledge concerning Lot 27. Buys did not even
see Lot 27 until the summer of 2003, three years after the Ivie Group acquired title and
two years after the valuation date. [R. 1096 at 25:5-7; 37:13-17] It was not surprising that
Buys did not visit the property before the Ivie Group acquired title or during the ensuing
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three years because the Ivie Group only acquired title as collateral for Aspen Ridge's
obligation to pay the remaining $750,000 owed for the purchase of the Ivie Group's
undeveloped acreage. [R. 1095 at 118:24-119:15; 121:10-16; 182:9-14; 184:6-9] Buys
and the rest of the Ivie Group never expected to use, develop or sell Lot 27, but simply
expected to reconvey it to Aspen Ridge when the balance of the purchase price was paid.
The Ivie Group presented no evidence at trial that Buys had any knowledge of land
values in the Wolf Creek Ranch area or that he had any knowledge of comparable lot
sales or of the value of Lot 27. Buys testified in no uncertain terms in his deposition
approximately one year before trial and long after his one visit to the property that he was
not in real estate and did not have an opinion as to the fair market value of Lot 27. [R.
1096 at 33:20-34:9] He did not even know the assessed value of the lot. [Id.]
The Ivie Group now argues that Buys was sufficiently knowledgeable concerning
Lot 27 because he had supposedly hunted on the land prior to the time the Ivie Group
obtained title to Lot 27, that he was aware that as of July 2001 the lot had been used as a
staging area for construction and there was a large dirt berm on the property, and "most
importantly" that "Buys had been involved in the marketing of Lot 27 to the public for
over a year prior to testifying at trial." [Appellees' Brief at 20] While these points, even
if true, are insufficient basis for Buys' testimony about the property's value more than
three years before trial, these arguments are not supported by the evidentiary records.

5

First, Buys did not testify that he hunted on Lot 27. The Ivie Group cites to
Douglas Anderson's testimony to attempt to support this purported fact. After referring
to Steven Ivie, Anderson simply vaguely testified that "they" hunted on the property, not
identifying who the "they" were. [R. 1096 at 239:17-19] Contrary to what the Ivie Group
tells the court, Buys testified that the one and only time that he was on Lot 27 was in the
summer of 2003 when he took his pictures of the front of the lot. [R. 1096 at 25:5-7;
33:5-12; and 37:13-17]1
The fact that there was a large dirt berm on the property in 2003 that had existed
since 1999 does not in any way establish a $500,000 value of the property and Buys did
not rely upon the condition of Lot 27 in his testimony on valuation to the jury. [R. 1096 at
30:1-7 and 39:13-41:6] This was not surprising given the fact that 25-30 lots in Wolf
Creek Ranch were used as construction staging areas and in 2003 it only cost $8,114.66 to
remediate the front of the lot that had been used as a staging area. [R. 1096 at 207:3-209:3
and Ex. 42]
Finally, there was no evidence that Buys had any involvement whatsoever in
efforts to sell Lot 27. Buys did not testify that he was involved in the sales effort nor was
there any other evidence he was involved in the effort. The Ivie Group's real estate agent,

1

Buys did testify that in the summer of 2000, he was in the general vicinity of the
lot but did not know where Lot 27 was. [R. 1096 at 41:7-18]
6

Douglas Tulloch, was retained by Steven Ivie and coordinated his sales effort with Mr.
Ivie. [See, e.g., R. 1096 at 78:25-79:17; 86:2-20; 87:20-25] Of course, even if it were
incorrectly assumed that Buys had some involvement with the sales effort, the effort to
sell Lot 27 in no way supported a $500,000 valuation. The Ivie Group listed Lot 27
originally for $850,000, then reduced the price temporarily to $799,000 and then
increased the listing price to $850,000 prior to trial and told the public that the lot was
listed at $400,000 under fair market value. [R. 1096 at 208:13-25; 88:10-22; 89:1-14 and
Exs.28&31]
The Ivie Group improperly argues in their brief that they only received one offer
for $500,000 during the time they had Lot 27 listed. This argument is improper and
should be disregarded because the district court properly excluded any evidence
concerning the amount of any offers from consideration by the jury and Buys did not
testify to the jury about the amount of any offers. [R. 1096 at 21:16-22:16; 40.16-19]2

2

When the district court heard Buys's testimony outside the presence of the jury
to determine whether it would permit Buys to testify on value, Buys testified without any
foundation, and over Aspen Ridge's objection, that the Ivie Group had received a
$500,000 offer (which apparently was rejected out of hand). However, the district court
ruled that Buys would not be permitted to testify to the offer before the jury and Buys did
not do so. [Id.] Clearly, this testimony concerning the amount of an offer from a third
party not only lacked any foundation but was also hearsay, and was not admissible to
prove value. Utah Department of Transportation v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031, 1036 (Utah
1984).
7
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the standard for proving the amount of damages is not as exacting, citing Atkin Wright &
Miles v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 709 P 2d ^30. 336 (I Hah I '.'N

cr ; : : '

.•' - • -• the iact of damage by proving that Lot 27 was worth less than $750,000.

! he I vie Group cites Edward L. Kimball and Ronald K Boyce, Utah Evidence
Law, / .2 (1006) for the general observation - - unsupported by any case law - - that "if lay
opinion is erroneously admitted, it should rarely require reversal . . . ," The authors w u e
•••^ speaking of any specific type of lay opinion. More importantly, w hether that general
ervation may have some merit in the usual case, this case was not usual. Buvs, u ho
was a long time resident of Wasatch County, was permitted to testify w ithout f uindation
to a Wasatch County jury in a case against a Salt Lake City developer l he jur
obviously bought his opinion wholesale. More relevant to the case at hai is the
recognition in Utah Evidence Law that in every IJtah case permitting an owner to testify
to value something "more than bare ownership" was involved Id. at ^ \ <•
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They failed to do so. Beyond that, as the Supreme Court recognized in Atkin, in order to
prove the amount of damages "there still must be evidence that rises above speculation
and provides a reasonable, even though not necessarily precise, estimate of damages" and
"approximations" must be "based upon reasonable assumptions or projections." [Id.] The
Ivie Group's damage "proof did not meet this standard. There was no reasonable basis
for Buys's approximation of the value of Lot 27; his testimony was the rankest conclusory
speculation.4
Provo River Water Users Ass 'n. v. Carlson, 133 P.2d 777, 782 (Utah 1943), cited
by the Ivie Group, does not support the admissibility of Buys's testimony. In that case,
the Supreme Court stated that the fact that a witness has limited experience with the
property would not make the witness incompetent to testify "if the witness was
acquainted with land values." In the case at bar, the Ivie Group presented no testimony at
all that Buys was familiar with land values (especially three and a half years prior to trial).
The Ivie Group's reliance on Vreeman v. Davis, 348 N.W.2d 756 (Minn. 1984) is
likewise misplaced. In that case, the owner of a mobile home was properly permitted to
testify concerning diminution in value based upon his testimony that he had comparison-

4

In fact, in Atkin, the Supreme Court reversed the damage award in favor of the
plaintiff on the basis that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the telephone company's
negligent operation of an intercept caused the plaintiffs reduction in gross income. The
court observed "the evidence did not raise more than a speculative possibility of the fact
of damage or of the amount of damages incurred." [Id.]
9

si loppe d foi a year befoi e bi i.} ii ig t lis i i lobile 1 lome and,, thus, was knowledgeable
concerning the value of i i lobile I ion i les [ Id at 857] K lein schrnii // i; h it n t c »w. 6- 12 h 2d
161, 164-165 (Ma. 1994), relied upon by the I vie Group, is also easily distinguished.
There, the phiiiiM,! testiheo Uuii \\ \\w defendant contractor would.have completed her
urn hi.list1 titiirh S'IH1 uu'iild h.r r ivntnl lin old luni'n1 in %
", 111» Ii 'Jin lr,. .1 loi VtOO a
month. The court simply held that the owner was competent to testify as to the rental
\ alue of her home. Ohvioush . fhr homeowner had detailed knowledge concerning her

i > .tine just because he was a 15% owner of Lot 27.^ The judgment should, therefore,
be reversed.

; wc i\u » uoup represents tliai \\n Ui.unei u^an "determined l-a^u U|HMI ouys's
testimony outside the presence of the jury that he ""was competent to provide an opinion
as to the fair market value of Lot 27." [Appellees' Brief at 11J That was not the basis of
the courts ruling. The court ruled that as an owner of Lot 27, Buys was competent U*
vsui v | R. 1096 at 27:13 -I "7 ] The court ruled based upon Buys's testimony outside the
presence of the jury that Buys c ould have an opinion contrary to what he testified to in his
deposition \Il at 2 7 ;^
10

2. The District Court Erred by Allowing Buys to Testify in Contradiction to
His Deposition Testimony and the Ivie Group's Interrogatory Answer That They
Had No Opinion on Value,
The Ivie Group does not deny that Buys testified in his deposition that he was not
in real estate and had no opinion on the fair market value of Lot 27, or that the Ivie Group
testified in answer to an interrogatory that they had no opinion as to the fair market value
of Lot 27 and that it was irrelevant to their damage claim. Instead, they attempt to spin
their interrogatory answer, wrongly argue that Aspen Ridge was not prejudiced by the
Ivie Group's failure to disclose the valuation testimony and that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in permitting the testimony. [Appellees' Brief at 24-27] These
arguments are insufficient to support admission of the valuation testimony.
First, the Ivie Group is not being candid in attempting to spin their interrogatory
answer. The Ivie Group attempts to argue that the interrogatory answer merely reflected
the fact that the Ivie Group did not believe fair market value was relevant because they
were seeking specific performance as a remedy. Although that would be irrelevant to
their obligation of disclosure, that is not what the interrogatory answer states.
The interrogatory required the Ivie Group to state its opinion as to the fair market
value of Lot 27 as of June 1, 2001, as of February 2003 and as of any other date that the
Ivie Group contended was relevant to their damage claim. The Ivie Group was obligated
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to disclose any opinion ..; ..*.. ; ,arka \ ,iiuc as oi June .

o<;. ,.,„; ivhiiuu> jw< 3

The Ivie Group responded that they "do not contend that the fair market value of Lot 27 is
relevant to their damage claim" [Emphasis Added] and, therefore, they had no contention
as to 11 le fail t i lar ke t v ali le of I ot 2 / •
At the time of this interrogatory answer, the only claim before the court was the
Tvie Group's damage claim. No specific performance claim was then before the court or,
indeed, ever before the court, Moreover, even when the 1\ u. < jroup unsuccessfully sought
lea\ e of' ::oi u: I: to file a 1 1 lit • :1 \ i: i lei icleci Cot: i lplaii it tc ad

foi spe> ::ific

performance, the Ivie Group still sought damages, or, ii; die alternative, specific
performance. [R. 175-183]
I he Ivie Group also seeks to justify tl: ten failure to disclose Buy s' 's fair market

Complaint until the first day of trial. This argument misstates the facts and in any event is

, iik, iv iv, uioup aucinpio U; v»\ vHvi a.. laiau i
v, UJ A; l;v asserting ihj-. ' \ ^-ca
Ridge never filed a motion seeking to compel Plain- .
provide a more complete
answer to this request " [Appellees' Brief at 4 j The short ans^ c* | t ) this contention is
there \\a> no reav>p tor Aspen Ridge to file a motion in . ompel Plaintiffs fully answered
the interrogatory b> stating they had no contention as to fair market value and that fair
market value was irrelevant to their damage claim.
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no excuse.7 The Ivie Group always asserted a claim for damages in this case. The Ivie
Group intentionally did not obtain an appraisal of Lot 27 and intended to attempt to prove
damages unrelated to the fair market value of Lot 27 well before they ever sought to add
an alternative claim for specific performance.8 The fact that the Ivie Group finally faced
reality and changed their strategy at the last minute does not justify their failure to
disclose this testimony until the second day of a three-day trial when Buys was asked his
opinion of value.
The Ivie Group further argues that the district court properly permitted this
testimony on the basis that they did not know fair market value would be relevant until
their claim for specific performance was denied. [Appellees' Brief at 26] The court did

7

The Ivie Group's argument is factually wrong. The court denied their first
motion to amend on October 22, 2004. [R. 575] Even when that motion was denied the
Ivie Group did not supplement their discovery responses or disclose in any manner Buys's
valuation testimony. Rather, the Ivie Group filed a second motion to amend on October
28, 2004 [R. 577-579] that was denied on the first day of trial. The Ivie Group implies
that the district court erred in denying the motion to amend. The district court acted well
within its discretion in denying the motion. The Ivie Group lost any right to seek specific
performance by acting inconsistent with such a remedy by listing the property for sale. In
any event, the Ivie Group did not appeal the denial of their motion. Instead, the Ivie
Group proceeded with their remaining damage claim.
8

The motion to file the Third Amended Complaint was not even filed until
November 19, 2003, 12 days before the then extended discovery cutoff of December 1.
[R. 116-119 and R. 175-183] Moreover, under the court's Scheduling Order, the Ivie
Group had been required to serve any expert reports no later than August 15, 2003 and
any rebuttal expert reports no later than October 10, 2003, months before the Ivie Group
sought leave to amend to add an alternative specific performance claim. [R. 82-83]
13
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Ivie Group could not prove any damages because they had no appraisal and all plaintiffs
i.ni ieMilicd in their depositions and in their interrogatory answer that they had no

cross-examine Buys on his surprise testimony or present impeachment evidence that
L

-;n Ridge had no reason to believe would be necessary given the Ivie Group's prior

unequivocal testimony.
I '"01: exan lple. i\spen R idge did 1 1 :)t 1 111 ' • 2 tl ie oppoi !:i n lit] - It :» exploi e 111 1 • disco^ - :M )
Buys's knowledge of land values in the area of Wolf Creek Ranch, his knowledge of

If Aspen Ridge had h. I immediately objected to the testimony, the Ivie Group
would have undoubtedly (and correctly) argued any o'bjection was waived. The nun* *n
that an objection equals a lack of prejudice is nonsensical.
14

comparable sales in Wolf Creek Ranch, his knowledge of Lot 27 and how he arrived at
his "valuation" of $500,000. Further, Aspen Ridge did not have the opportunity to
investigate and gather possible impeachment evidence such as whether Buys' or any of
the other Plaintiffs had listed Lot 27 on financial statements representing it had a value
substantially in excess of Buys's "valuation." Buys's surprise testimony went to the very
heart of the case. Aspen Ridge was seriously prejudiced by the district court's decision to
permit Buys to testify on value. There was no reasonable basis for the district court's
decision to permit this surprise testimony and the district court abused its discretion in
doing so.10

3. There Was No Other Substantial Evidence to Support the Jury's Award of
Damages.
The Ivie Group erroneously argues that even if the district court erred in permitting
Buys to testify concerning value, other evidence produced at trial was sufficient to

10

The Ivie Group cites Procon Corp. v. Utah Dept. of Transportation, 876 P.2d
890, 893 (Utah App. 1994) for the proposition that a trial court's decision whether to
impose discovery sanctions will not be overturned unless the decision is "'beyond the
limits of reasonably."' Procon did not involve any issue of discovery sanctions and the
decision does not contain the quoted language. In any event, the district court's decision
in this case was "beyond the limits of reasonability."
15

suppoi: t the jury' s $500,000 damage award, m laci. ihere was no substantial ev idei ice to

1 he 1\ IC Group first points to the purported feet that Anderson testified that
because of the problems in the stock market in 2000 and the terrorist attacks of September
II I , 2001, tl lei e \ v as a 'big cl lai ige r ii 11:1 i z it n n i ibei of sale s at ' ; ' - : If Ci eek R ancl I
[Appellees' Brief at 28] Initially, Anderson did not testily there was a "big change" but
only that the number of sales wen! (low \ "^ 1006 at 10r ~ 11] Howe\ei\ Andersoi I
whose testimony on tl lis subject was undisputed - - testified that the prices of the lots
§ I'muuii ii" \Uihlv !iI'll1 linn mi iiiii'i fif',*;11!1 thv s*r/rs pm n \ lai / iin leusnt
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19J At the time of trial, 54 of the 84 lots in Wolf Creek Ranch had been sold. [R. 1096 at
158:22-25] The testimony was that the speed with which a property sells does not effect
. K, I \

-en on sal

.ill:

vears

which ib adjacent to the eabt ul Lot 2:, bold in late 2000, after the slow down in sales, for
^ 1 * ^ 0 0 0 . [R. 1096 at 125:2-9] Lot 28, which was adjacent to Lot 27 on the west, sold
ii I 1 ii i/l i *ai i: le til i n • ft ; ii i: ic : f< >i $ 1 220,000.11

lit I\ ic (iroup asserts that "Aspen Ridge's own witness" testified there was
"direct correlation between a slow market and market value/' [Appellees' Brief at 28]
The Ivie Group r referring to Douglas Tulloch, the l\ ic (Iroup \s real estate broker, who
testified thai "ihe only determining factor in market value" "is always what somebody is
••\!!|MV I.-sell \K: md Hhai somebody is will to pay." [R. 1096 at 83:3-9]
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The Ivie Group also argues that there was evidence that Lot 27 was "one of the
least desirable parcels" in Wolf Creek Ranch because it had few trees and there was a
"field of debris on the front portion of the lot and a large dirt berm on the front portion of
the lot that Aspen Ridge had used as a staging area for construction and the lot needed a
$200,000 driveway." Once more, the fact that Lot 27 was used as a staging area was
insignificant because it cost only $8,114.66 in 2003 to remediate the lot. [R. 1096 at
207:3-209:3 and Ex. 42] There are about 25 to 30 lots in Wolf Creek Ranch that were
used as staging areas adjacent to the roadway because 27 miles of road had to be
constructed. That construction had been going on on a daily basis for years and was still
ongoing at the time of trial. [R. 1096 at 205:20-206:4] Further, many lots in Wolf Creek
Ranch required the same kind of expenditure for a driveway and an expensive driveway
would only have to be constructed on Lot 27 so you could put the house where there
would be a view. An inexpensive driveway could be constructed if the house were closer
to the road. [R. 1096 at 166:7-24; 110:5-15] Under the CC&Rs for Wolf Creek Ranch,
there was a 300 foot setback at a minimum and it is not uncommon to see long driveways
of 2,000 or 3,000 feet. In fact, some driveways are as long as 6,000 feet. [R. 1096 at
166:7-16] Lot 26 - - right next door to Lot 27 - - required a longer driveway than Lot 27
and Lot 26 sold for $1,175,000. [R. 1096 at 175:16-20; 124:8-21]

17

""i' I tl icn igl i tl i ::; I1 ' ie G:t 01 if: claii i is I i lllocl i testii led tl lat I ot 2 ) w as " 'one of the
worse looking lots", that is not at all what lulloch testified, 1 o the o^*: •

\h, \

Group's counsel asked the leading question "in other words, nm >{ ihe ^ or^e looking 1-:^
up there, . ,;i

. . J . iv.poi uk... - — , . , vcr\ bad then:' [R. 1096 at 97:25-98:2]

listed it. After the lot was cleaned up, Tuiloch testified that the lot "looks fine". [Id. at
10^:2-108:11 Tulloch testified thai he thought Lot 2r is a "great lot for the price" of

i nidii}, the l. ! /*

"*•!..

1 (

IIJI! I U I \\'\ s H | ,i( (In (nil

I

rial m m? way establishes a valuation of $500,000. By the Ivie Group's rationale, land
depreciates in value over time until it is sold, Of course, that is not the case. It is
i (iiiiiin in kiHru InJi-i; llml limtl gtiieial'ly appreciates in wlm , ll lakes years to sell out a
project such as Wolf Creek Ranch. 1 'he coi nparable sales at Wolf Creek R ai icl i :: • ' ei tl i s
years demonstrate beyond dispute that land values did not depreciate but remained stable
and on average increased.
li it si loi: t, thei e w as t 10 ev idei ice \ lpoi i '1 • I lich tl I s ji u ) coi ild 1 la v e i easonably i elie :!
to support its award of damages in the amount of $500,000 other than Buys's testimony
that $500,000 was the fair market value, which testimony was without any foundation and
was improperly admitted by the district court,
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B. IN ANY EVENT, THE IVIE GROUP WAS NOT ENTITLED TO
RECOVER PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST.
The Ivie Group concedes that to obtain pre-judgment interest, the jury's
determination of Lot 27fs value had to be "ascertained in accordance with fixed rules of
evidence and known standards of value." [Appellees' Brief at 30] The Ivie Group
incorrectly argues, however, that the jury's determination met this standard because the
contract price was $750,000 and the fair market value of the land was $500,000.
This argument ignores the fact that Buys's testimony on value was not based upon
any "known standards of value" but was simply his subjective opinion, untethered to any
standard at all. Unlike the situation in Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, 82 P.3d
1064, upon which the Ivie Group attempts to rely, the value was not established by an
appraiser using generally accepted principles of appraising. Aspen Ridge's appraiser,
who utilized those generally accepted principles of appraising, testified that the fair
market value of Lot 27 was $1,220,000, so that the Ivie Group suffered no damages. The
amount of damages based on Buys's testimony was unknown and could not have been
calculated until Buys took the stand and testified without rhyme or reason to a $500,000
value. Consequently, the district court committed error as a matter of law in awarding
pre-judgment interest.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the judgment should be
reversed and the case remanded with directions to enter judgment that the Ivie Group is
not entitled to recover damages, or is only entitled to recover nominal damages, and for
the district court to determine whether the attorneys' fee award to the Ivie Group should
be set aside and attorneys' fees awarded to Aspen Ridge as the prevailing party, and the
amount thereof In the alternative, the award of pre-judgment interest should be reversed.
DATED this | 5

day of September, 2005.
LBIDGE & MITCHELL
BURBIDGE
By_
JEFFERSON W. GROSS '
Attorneys for Appellant
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